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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  The for-profit higher education 
sector expanded significantly in 
the twenty-first century, but its 
role remains a topic of significant 
controversy due to poor student 
outcomes.
n  When California eliminated the 
use of state aid at most for-profit 
colleges in the early 2010s, many 
students chose to remain enrolled 
in for-profit colleges and shoulder a 
larger burden of the costs.
n  As significant financial penalties 
do little to shift enrollment, improving 
the disclosure of college quality is 
also unlikely to affect where students 
enroll.
n  Shifting students away from 
enrolling in poor-performing for-
profit colleges may require stronger 
policies, such as eliminating access to 
federal funds. 
n  Government could help public 
colleges become more responsive 
to student demand by expanding 
popular programs, as limited access 
may drive students out of public 
colleges and into the for-profit sector.  
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_ 
workingpapers/21-356/. 
The for-proft higher education sector expanded signifcantly in the twenty-frst 
century and has become a topic of considerable controversy. Advocates for the sector 
argue that the for-proft motive increases innovation and responsiveness to the market, 
leading to better opportunities for students excluded from traditional higher education. 
Despite these theoretical advantages, most research fnds that for-proft students have 
worse labor market outcomes and higher levels of student debt, even afer accounting for 
diferences in the background characteristics of who attends. Tis research has generated 
concerns about the sector and catalyzed two common regulatory responses—eforts to 
improve information about school “quality” and restrictions on the use of Pell Grants and 
federal loans—in order to dissuade enrollment in low-quality institutions. 
We examine how a policy change in California that eliminated the use of state aid to 
subsidize for-proft enrollment afected student enrollment and degree attainment. We 
fnd that eliminating this state aid did little to change students’ educational outcomes, 
with most students choosing to remain in for-proft colleges while shouldering a larger 
burden of the costs. 
Our fndings suggest the following policy implications: 
• Reductions in eligibility for state fnancial aid by themselves are unlikely to 
dissuade students from attending for-proft colleges. 
• As signifcant fnancial penalties do little to shif enrollment, improving the 
disclosure of college quality—a lighter-touch approach—is also unlikely to afect 
where students enroll. 
• If the goal is to shif students away from enrolling in poor-performing for-proft 
colleges, stronger policies, such as eliminating access to federal funds, may be 
necessary. 
• Additionally, government could help public colleges become more responsive to 
student demand by expanding popular programs. For instance, the most common 
for-proft degree in our study is for health careers, whereas California’s community 
college health programs are frequently oversubscribed and can require students to 
wait years before enrollment, likely pushing some students into the for-proft sector. 
Our study focuses on educational outcomes but does not yet examine the implications 
of for-proft enrollment on students’ fnancial health. In future work, we hope to examine 
how the same fnancial aid policy afected former students’ debt and default rates for 
various forms of credit, including student loans. 
Background 
California’s Cal Grant is the largest state aid program in the nation, with eligibility 
determined by both fnancial need (income) and merit (GPA). Te Cal Grant targets 
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Te Cal Grant provided 
four years of full 
tuition and fees at any 
in-state public four-
year institution, an
annual $1,500 subsidy 
for community college 
enrollment, or an annual 
$9,700 subsidy to attend 
private colleges. 
low- and middle-income students through two programs: the Entitlement grant for 
“traditional” high school graduates, and the Competitive grant awarded more selectively 
toward older, nontraditional students. At the time of our study, the Cal Grant provided 
four years of full tuition and fees at any in-state public four-year institution, an annual 
$1,500 subsidy for community college enrollment, or an annual $9,700 subsidy to attend 
private colleges. 
Budgetary pressures from the Great Recession and reports of for-proft colleges’ 
inefectiveness led California to eliminate Cal Grant eligibility at a small set of for-
profts in the 2011–2012 school year and then at nearly all for-profts in 2012–2013. 
Tis policy falls into one of two broad approaches typically taken by the government to 
infuence college choice. Te less intensive approach is to advocate for better consumer 
information, such as the U.S. Department of Education’s College Scorecard, in the hopes 
that more-accessible measures of a college’s quality might induce students to avoid low-
performing schools. Alternately, the government can target low-performing institutions, 
typically measured via cohort default rates, student earnings-to-debt ratios, or other 
loan-repayment metrics, and restrict such institutions from accessing federal funds, 
which typically leads to school closure. Prior studies have found that such sanctions 
in the 1990s decreased student enrollment at targeted for-profts, and pushed Pell-
eligible students into neighboring community colleges (Cellini, Darolia, and Turner 
2020). California’s approach is something of a middle ground, as losing state aid is more 
intensive than information disclosure, but not so severe that it would lead to the college’s 
closure. 
How Students React to Loss of Aid at For-Profts 
To study the impacts of this policy change we use individual-level data on all Cal 
Grant applicants from 2007–2008 through 2012–2013, provided to us by the California 
Student Aid Commission, which administers the program. We compare students who 
were afected by the policy (those who listed for-proft colleges on their FAFSA fnancial 
aid application before the policy took efect) to students who should not have been 
afected, and how these diferences changed over time. For traditional students from high 
school, we compare individuals who look observationally similar except for their FAFSA 
plans, whereas for nontraditional older students, we compare individuals expressing 
interest in for-profts on their FAFSA but who either did or did not qualify for the Cal 
Grant based on eligibility criteria. 
For nontraditional students interested in for-profts, we fnd that restricting the 
use of the Cal Grant at for-proft institutions led to no change in student behaviors or 
outcomes. Te lef panel of Figure 1 shows that 70 percent of students who initially 
met the award criteria received and used the Cal Grant at a for-proft college before the 
restrictions were enacted in 2012–2013. In contrast, about 10 percent of students who 
did not initially meet the award criteria ended up receiving a Cal Grant (usually through 
an appeals process) and used it at a for-proft college. When the restrictions took efect 
in 2012, Cal Grant usage at for-proft colleges declined sharply, especially for the initially 
eligible students. As shown in the right panel, however, actual attendance rates at for-
proft colleges were similar regardless of initial Cal Grant eligibility, and the two groups 
of students have near-identical declines in for-proft attendance between 2011 and 2012, 
when the policy went into efect. 
Tus, nontraditional students’ decisions to enroll in a for-proft were almost 
completely indiferent to the policy change, even though we demonstrate a dramatic loss 
in state aid of roughly $10,000 per eligible student. In our paper, we also show that the 
policy change had no impact on the likelihood these students earned a degree at a for-
proft college or anywhere else, such as at a community college. 
For “traditional” recent high school graduates, we again fnd that students who lost 
state aid mostly chose to enroll in for-proft colleges, though results are a bit more mixed. 
We fnd suggestive evidence that the loss of aid slightly decreased the chance these 
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Figure 1  Older “Non-Traditional” Students 
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students earned a degree at a for-proft college, partly because some students shifed 
into community colleges and partly because some students chose not to attend college 
at all. Tese results are sensitive to reasonable changes to our model, but a conservative 
interpretation is that preferences for enrollment in the for-proft sector remained strong 
for both groups of students. 
Some Possible Explanations 
Our results show that student preferences for for-proft colleges are relatively 
insensitive to a large loss in aid, especially among older, nontraditional students. Why 
might this be the case? Although for-profts might ofer greater fexibility, such as a larger 
selection of online courses, students who live physically closer to a community college 
campus are no more likely to shif sector of enrollment. Additionally, nontraditional 
students who had previously attended a community college were equally likely to shif 
enrollment as those who had not, suggesting that preferences for for-profts are not likely 
driven by poor prior experiences in the public sector. 
Rather, the strongest potential explanation for students’ for-proft preferences are 
the diferent types of degree programs ofered by for-proft and public colleges. For 
instance, as shown in Figure 2, 46 percent of degrees earned at for-proft colleges by 
recent high school graduates in our sample are in health professions, compared to only 
4 percent of degrees earned at public colleges. Prior studies have found that California’s 
public community colleges are unable to meet total demand in certain programs, such as 
health care, and ofen resort to using random lotteries to allocate the limited number of 
available seats (Grosz 2020). 
Conclusion 
We believe our results suggest several legal and policy implications. First, 
policymakers should be aware of the limited efectiveness of using such state aid 
restrictions to “nudge” students into alternate colleges. Students in our study lose 
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Figure 2  Degree Types by Postsecondary Sector—Traditional Sample 
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signifcant funding but are still eligible for Pell Grants, federal loans, and other resources 
that facilitate attendance. Terefore, a policy goal to shif students away from enrolling 
in poor-performing for-proft colleges may require stronger policies, including 
eliminating access to federal funds. Although traditional-aged students may respond to 
aid restrictions by partly shifing enrollment to community colleges, our results show 
impacts far smaller than those found in studies examining for-proft closures. Alternative 
eforts that aim to shif student choice through increased disclosure of a college’s “quality” 
are also unlikely to be efective, both because of their less intensive nature and possible 
eforts on the part of colleges to game these statistics. 
Te demand for for-proft education likely stems in part from the availability of degree 
programs that are in high demand. However, greater degree availability at for-profts 
must be tempered by serious concerns about the quality of these for-proft degrees, and 
how these colleges use aggressive and ofen fraudulent advertising practices to convince 
students to attend (U.S. Department of Education 2021). Policymakers interested in 
infuencing student choice can help public colleges adopt the program attributes that 
have given rise to such strong demand, particularly by increasing funding or removing 
other barriers that prevent community colleges from expanding popular programs. 
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